Turning to the “Dark Side”

Learning in Illicit Networks

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CTCP Illicit Networks Workshop
# Trafficking Adaptations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farming</th>
<th>Drug Processing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Replant in new fields</td>
<td>• Re-label bottles, containers</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Farm in protected forests</td>
<td>• Substitute chemicals/inputs</td>
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<tr>
<td>•Hide crops in others</td>
<td>• Shift to mobile kitchen labs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cover plants with spays</td>
<td>• Recycle ether, acetone, gasoline</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Prune stalks of sprayed plants</td>
<td>• Make potassium permanganate</td>
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<td><strong>Transportation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Wholesale Distribution</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Move routes to areas with less pressure</td>
<td>• Change phone numbers, use pay phones, cloned cell phones</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fly around radar installations; blend in with heavy traffic</td>
<td>• Use different vehicles, modify cars with hiding compartments</td>
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<td>• Shift to different vessels</td>
<td>• Move stash houses</td>
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<td>• Switch among different containerized cargo: semi-submersibles</td>
<td>• Move or remove cell members, disband cell</td>
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<td>• Break down loads into smaller shipments, conduct “dry runs”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorist Adaptations</td>
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<td><strong>Communications</strong></td>
<td><strong>Targeting</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change cell phones, SIM cards</td>
<td>• Shift to “softer” targets: restaurants, nightclubs, public transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Text messages</td>
<td>• Respond to aviation security procedures and technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Use code words and aliases</td>
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<td>• Internet: email, message boards, Skype, virtual dead drops</td>
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<td>• Shift to human couriers</td>
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<td>• Compartment information flows</td>
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<td><strong>Munitions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tactics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Improve detonation: from wires to wireless systems (IRA &amp; Hezbollah)</td>
<td>• Use of suicide bombers</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Improve accuracy and lethality of explosives: from crude IEDs to shaped charges</td>
<td>• Substitution effects: assassinations and hostage taking incidents</td>
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<td>• “Swarming” coalition forces (Iraq)</td>
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<td>• Better camouflage (Afghanistan)</td>
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<td>• Fight in smaller groups</td>
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Colombian wheel network

Source: From Pablo to Osama
From wheels to chains

- Exporters/transportation coordinators
- Processing labs
- Paste/base buyers
- Farmers
- Intermediary-broker
- Aviation/maritime transportation rings
- Intermediary-broker
- Money launderers
- Retailers
- Wholesalers
- Distribution cells
Al Qaeda Wheel network

- General Emir: Bin Laden
  - Shura majlis
  - “General Emir” Bin Laden
- Business & finance Committee
- Construction company
- Cell
- Relief agency
- Military committee
- Currency trading company
- Training camp
- Investment and finance Committee
- Agricultural company
- Media/information committee
- Import-export firm
- Sharia committee
- Training camp administration subcommittees
- Construction company
- Foreign purchases committee
- Illegal arms dealer
- Equipment provider
- Illegal arms dealer
- News journals
- Safe-house
- Training camp
- Training camp
References

- Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, *Organizational Learning II* (Addison-Wesley, 1996).
- Adam Dolnick, *Understanding Terrorist Innovation* (Routledge, 2007)